7th Assignment

LCA and Sabatier

Think up four ways in which government can increase the use of LCAs through external control and setting boundary conditions. Use Sabatier’s framework to assess the potential effectiveness of external control vis-a-vis other options.

This week, our lecture was based on the study of Government and Public Policy, how they can apply not only to government but other forms of organization and how policies are implemented, certainly not an easy job for governments.

Thinking about this week’s assignment, I have come up with four possible ways in which governments may be able to increase the use of LCA as a form of assessing environmental impact.

#1: By direct external control, enforcing a rule in which they make it mandatory for some products on the market, such as food, drinks, shampoos, cleaners and so on to include the global warming potential or other characterization factors of the potential environmental impact of their product on their label, much as they do with nutrition facts or toxicity hazards. Producers  (some of them at least) will be forced by law to perform LCAs of their products in order to be able to calculate the information required by the government and be able to comply with the new law, hens increasing the use of LCA.

#2: Within their environmental agency or as an independent entity, the government may set up a Life Cycle Assesment office, which can have functions such as evaluating the environmental impact of certain products and making their results public for consumers.

 By making this information public, they will not only be already increasing the use of LCA by means of their own office, but may make companies (incredulous or worried about their public image due to negative outcomes) try to challenge their results by performing private assessments or beat them to the punch by performing LCAs for other products not yet evaluated.

Also consumers may see LCA information as a desirable trait in a product and companies may start performing this analysis as means to keep up with consumer demand.

#3: As a way to set boundary conditions, the Government may fund LCA courses and discussion meetings where they invite different firms of the same field. Firms attending these seminars can network, learn about LCA  and its application, get acquainted with the LCA framework and if one or two start implementing LCA, it would be likely that others will follow in search for legitimacy.

#4: Giving subsidy for “lower impact products”, the government would encourage the production of products that have lower environmental impact factors or give some kind of taxation waver incentives to companies that manage to lower their overall environmental impact.

This will most likely increase the use of LCA as a tool to assess the reduction on environmental impact and measuring results to implement this policy. This can also apply for private interest governments, under a threat of penalization for emmitins of certain industry type, they would be forced to apply LCA tools to monitor their environmental impact levels.

Sabatier’s framework of policy implementation analysis, provides us with a way to identify the factors that affect the achievement of statutory objectives (Sabatier, 1980).

Figure1 depicts this framework in a very basic form:

Figure 1.

 For the case of LCA increase, below you’ll find a comparison of Sabatiers framework between external control and other options.

1)     The tractability of the problem:

1.1: External control: most likely would have to gather a lot of data and maybe consult on experts on the matter in order to have a clear understanding of the necessity of the tool, it’s results and how can it be applied, however, no very specific technology is required and most is easily available. Target groups are very diverse and in most cases there is a need for major behavioral change, since most companies are not familiar with the LCA tool and it’s implications, and they can vary from major corporations to small business owner, wich makes the boundaries of LCA totally different and makes the effectiveness of the program harder to monitor because the use of LCA in larger corporations may be more effective and useful than by single individuals or small firms. (We can do the LCA of using a mug instead of plastic cup in our house and decide which to use, but the impacts would be severely smaller that those of major firms using LCA to monitor their emissions).

1.2 Boundary conditions: More tractable problem, still requires the government to know the tool, but not to such a far extent and target groups are diverse, but they can target clusters of similar firms which will make it easy as firms from similar fields interested in adopting LCA would share knowledge in this tool for similar products.

1.3Private Interest Government: Private interest governments would have technical information readily available, target group s not so diverse, meaning most private interest governments are clusters of similar firms and behavioral change may not be as drastic since most firms are accustomed to regulation compliance protocols and most likely already apply LCAs or oher forms of environmental assessment tools.

2)     Ability of Statue to structure implementation:

2.1: External control: Implementing external control as a form to increase the use of LCA has no clear purpose but to increase the use of this tool, and we imagine that a positive environmental impact should come about using this tool, however, this is not explicitly specified as the problem being addressed nor there is a way to probe this will happen. Would need implementers to be strongly commited and it is not likely that setting up a government agency with this projects will be invested enough in it, having other more pressing issues at hand.

2.2: Self organization: By setting boundary conditions, agencies would voluntarily adopt LCA as a tool and most likely will put to use the information available. Their objective to use it will be more clearly defined.

To set up boundary conditions, not a lot of infrastructure and personnel would be required, and once firms catch on the application of LCA, there would be little work to do by the government but periodical checks on the development of this initiative.

2.3: Private interest government: Private firms would have the funds, to implement a wide spread use of LCA. Also have expert and motivated implementers (motivated by threat of external control and interest in their own practice).

3)     Non Statutory Variables Affecting implementation

3.1 External Control: External variables as delay in cooperation or having  other more pressing agenda can interfere with the implementation of this policy.

3.2 Self organization: Lack of external incentive to apply LCA  or not enough motivation may not make it possible to increase the use of LCA. , Different interpretations and boundaries set by different private actors leading to different results can also reduce the credibility of the tool, undermining its use.

3.3 Private Interest government: Lack of commitment of leadership skills from enforcing officials might prevent the widespread use of LCA as a common tool, unwillingness too cooperate.

So, in regards of the above, it could be said that for the increase in use of LCA, self organization and private interest government can provide a more effective option to enforce this policy.

Reference:

Sabatier, P. and Mazmanian, D. (1980), THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS. Policy Studies Journal, 8: 538–560. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-0072.1980.tb01266.x

6th Assignment

 The Harvest Game!

This week’s assignment reads as follows:

In the classroom, we played the game of harvest without allowing teams to communicate. The end result was that the resource system collapsed.

We now allow for communication among teams [this is the ONLY change in the set up!]. Think up a set of additional rules for the game that effectively ensures that teams collectively do not exceed the sustainable yield. Within the context of the game, teams may create new entities (a policing force, a common meeting, etc.); you CANNOT assume something like a government already exist; if you need it, the teams will have to create it by themselves

The Harvest Game:

Last class we played The Harvest Game, we divided the group into six groups, each group represents a fishing boat, every boat goes out once a year to fish and comes back with a certain bounty, the purpose is to get the most amount of fish.

The rules of the game are:

-Each round is one year. Each team decides how many fish they want to catch. Write down this number and put it in your boat

-Facilitator takes boats and gives fish randomly to teams until they are gone. Rest of teams receive nothing

-You get back your boat + harvest. Write down your profit

- The sea starts with the maximum number of fish: 50. Each year, the remaining fish are able to produce one new fish, with a maximum of 50.

Purposefully, the aim of the game was set as “getting the most amount of fish”, this goal can be open for interpretation, most of the groups decided that getting the “most amount of fish” meant an individual effort, that each team should focus on getting more fish than the others, and consequently doing it in the least amount of time, because as time went by, the least certainty of the number of fish in the sea, and the more risk of another team outdoing yo

However, another mentality could have risen while playing this game, I guess only until we had fished the sea empty did any of us realized that another approach to this game was actually possible “getting the highest amount of fish” meant, making our fish resources last for several rounds without “depleting” the fish, hence getting the most fish from the sea as a hole.

This way we ALL win, the fish is always plentiful, and we can go on for several rounds, getting the highest amount of fish possible.

This is easier said than done, maybe our group would stick to fishing only the “sustainable” amount of fish, if the game was played the second time… but this would make for a very boring game, and it’s actually not fair because we had already fished the sea empty, so in real life… there is no second chance.

How then could we possibly re structure this game so it can go ideally for ever (or at least several rounds) without exhausting the number of fish available?

We don’t know how many fish are in the sea at every round, but we do know that we start with 50 fish and that for every fish left after every round, you would get double the amount next year.

We know then that the only way that the game can last “forever” is if every round boats only fish half or less than half of the initial amount of fish and no more.

Boats are free to fish whatever they want, but maybe there is a way to deviate their attention from wanting to get the most fish they can every round and try to make them think on a long run strategy.

With this in mind, new rules are set:

We can divide the teams into two sectors, A and B, half of the teams will be in sector A and the other half on sector B.

Each sector has exactly half of the total initial amount of fish and boats can only go out to fish on their own sector.

Sector A will go out to fish first followed by Sector B.

Each team will still be going out to fish on their own, but the teams that empty their sector first will get automatically disqualified.

Teams can now communicate with the other teams in their sector (only the ones on their sector) to make sure they can go out for more rounds.

When one of the sectors is depleted, the teams on the competing sector get one more round, this time without communication. In this round they can take as many fish as they want, BUT if they too empty their sector in this final round, they are all eliminated and the team with the most fish in the previously disqualified sector wins, otherwise, the team with the most fish in the standing sector wins the game.

Admittedly this does not make for the most fun game ever played, but adds a factor that will (if not forever) ensure that the game goes on for more rounds than the original version.

Now each boat should think not only for itself but as a team with their sector, and should try to self organize in order to avoid being disqualified. At the same time, the final round after one sector is emptied will help make the game more interesting. Each team would now be thinking on individual victory, but at the same time has to be careful not to empty their own sector and forfeiting the game to the boat with most fish on the other sector.

These rules certainly do not translate to a real life scenario, but might teach us a lesson that can apply to real life. If each team only seeks individual glory, the game will not last more that a few rounds, however, when you are faced with the challenge of thinking as a team, and realize the harm of emptying the sea and how it impacts you… then you are bound to join forces.

The goal is still fishing and getting as much fish as possible, but the scope of our goal is set on a framework where people realize that emptying the sea comes to the detriment of all (much as in real life).

So hopefully, there is a chance to play the game with this set of rules and try to see what the outcome may be.

5th Assignment

NETWORKS

1.Identify a regional network of production (drawing on own experience, literature, the news).
2.Analyze this network using at least two of the concepts presented, paying particular attention to the linkages of the regional network with ‘non-local’ actors.3.Make clear how the network you identify constrains and/or enables actors to work towards closing material loops.

Last class was all about networks, what they are, how they are structured and their utility for Industrial Ecology. For this week's assignment we were asked to think of a particular regional network, regional networks can be defined as networks that are delimited and formed due to location, they are bounded by region and activity is spatially concentrated in certain locations. The network structures we can find in such clusters can be categorized into three different forms: agglomeration, industrial complex or social networks. 

One of my favorite examples of an industrial complex is the Wissington facility of UK's main beet sugar producer, British Sugar [BS]. British sugar is owner of the biggest beet sugar refinery in the world, located in the industrial complex of Wissington Norfolk, UK. For over 25 years, a cluster of different industries has grown and developed in the area, forming what I would classify as an industrial complex, but as specified by Gordon and McCann, more than only one type of network can be observed at the complex.

Some examples of how this self organized network interacts are as follow:

-       The site contains most of the farmland where the beets are grown, therefore increasing interaction between local farmers and reducing costs of transportation from de field to the refinery.This interaction has renderd beneficial for both BS and the farmers, BS has taken advantage of the closer relationship with the farmers, developing trust between them and allowing them to actively colabotare to increase the crop yield of the sugar beet by means of scientific research that has given them information that farmers can apply directly at the field . This network goes both ways, and the dependency relation between both parties is pretty much equilibrated, since farmers need BS to sell their goods and to help with research on beet sugar growth and BS needs the farmers since they provide the raw material for their core production of sugar, also their relationship is well developed and trust is a main factor, since beet is regarded as a difficult crop and farmers could choose to grow other crops, but the security of having a buyer that is also concerned in crop yield and quality, helps tighten this relationship.

-       CO2 rich flue gas has been used at green houses built on site for the horticulture of tomatoes. BS partnered with a local distributor for the retail of tomatoes, British Sugar controls the production, but has decided to bring an external player that has expertise in the horticulture market. This form of network allows the exchange of knowledge, generating dependency between BS and its retailer, which has the expertise in horticulture BS lacks, since it's main production consists of sugars and syrups. 

-       The sight has an installation to produce bioethanol out of sugar molasses, this instalation constitutes a JV between BS, Dupont and BP, this type of network fits more in the Social network definition, having been developed through mutual cooperation and trust between these companies.
BP actually approached BS and now they are sharing capacity and expertice to develope this Bioethanol plant, which is profitable for all participants since they enjoy a subsidy from the british government.  This kinds of interactions help close material loops by utilizing surplus sugar and waste bagasse as raw material for bio fuels, these materials would otherwise be thrown to landfill but are now used to produce fuels that to some extent are used in lorries for the famring of sugar beet.

-       Apart from the British Sugar, companies like Air Liquide (experts in liquefaction) have collocated in the Wissington site, where they receive the CO2 waste stream from the sugar fermentation to bioethanol liquefy it and sell it for the gasification of soft drinks, a good example of how this network is helping close material loops by repurposing waste streams.

-       BS uses byproducts from the sugar refining process as materials for pharmaceutical process, animal feed, topsoil and so on, involving different players in this resource network where different material are exchanged and BS has a central role.

 The interest of British Sugar to develop these links within their industrial cluster came about as a consequence of external business pressures.

Changes in the European Union (EU) Common Agricultural Policy coupled with increasingly open global trade agreements would progressively open the UK market up to competition. This, combined with the expanded production of low-cost sugar derived not from beets, but from sugar cane in developing nations, represented a significant threat to the future of British Sugar. [1]

As a response to this pressure, BS developed a series of strategies that brought about the formation of this network, in order to give value to waste and increase profit to the actors in the cluster. (Specially BS) Then, non-local actors such as sugar cane producers and policy makers, have served in this case to make this network more tightly coupled and to develop strategies to close material loops in order to increase profit for BS.

The Wissington site can be considered a centralized Network, and British Sugar is positioned in the center of it all, having interactions with every actor in the network, but actors not having any real interaction with each other. In this way, BS is in a position of power as they have created a dependency for all their consumers on all their different byproducts.

In conclusion, Wissington sight is a mix of resource network and regional network with industrial complex and social network interaction, where the giant of sugar beat refining British Sugar has a role of centrality and is the only one interacting with the other actors in the network.

References:

[1] From Refining Sugar to Growing Tomatoes

Industrial Ecology and Business Model Evolution

Samuel W. Short, Nancy M.P. Bocken, Claire Y. Barlow, and Marian R. Chertow

[2] . Gordon, I. and McCann, P. 2000. Industrial Clusters: Complexes, Agglomeration and/or Social Networks? Urban Studies 37(3): 513–532.